ABSTRACT The avionics world is making the transition in the coming years to the automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) communication in order to determine parameters like for instance position and velocity of the aircraft in the air. The standard does not currently include any kind of authentication or encryption in the transmitted messages and is therefore vulnerable against different types of attacks. In this paper, a system, called holistic air protection (HAP), is proposed, which is able to provide different levels of security by offering authentication of the payload with potential encryption of identifier and/or payload of the message. As a consequence, a holistic solution is obtained, which can be applied by both commercial and military aircraft or in case of a security attack. HAP relies on implicit certificates and a generalized elliptic curve-based signcryption scheme. The resulting overhead due to the cryptographic operations is in the same range as the timed efficient stream loss-tolerant authentication (TESLA)-based proposed security schemes, considering the same security strength. Moreover, HAP is also able to obtain faster authentication and a thus faster guarantee of a verified update.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Automatic Dependent Surveillance -Broadcast (ADS-B) will soon become the common communication technology to manage traffic control and airplane related information for both commercial and military airplanes. It is proposed as successor of the radar based technology relying on primary surveillance radars (PSR) and secondary surveillance radars (SSR), as it offers more optimal precision and detection accuracy [1] and in addition requires less maintenance costs. ADS-B has been standardized since many years. Both the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and its European counterpart EUROCONTROL have mandated its deployment for 2020, and so ADS-B will gradually replace the radar based technology in future. This transition will be a slow process due to the expensive cost of equipping all aircraft with the required avionics.
ADS-B allows an aircraft to determine its position via satellite navigation. Instead of being interrogated, the aircraft periodically broadcasts this information to both air traffic control ground stations and other aircraft in its range. The main current drawback of the ADS-B technology is that no security mechanisms are provided in the standard. There are
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neither authentication, nor encryption mechanisms defined yet. As a consequence, it makes the communication vulnerable for a wide range of attacks.
Many solutions have been proposed in literature to offer resistance against these type of attacks. The solutions can be classified in either cryptographic or non-cryptographic based approaches. With respect to this last category, a variety of location verification schemes [2] - [4] are described based on the mulltilateration technology [5] , [6] . This technology allows to determine the position of the transmitter (aircraft), given the exact distance between transmitter and four receivers. It has been shown that the proposed schemes are able to effectively detect attackers using a single transmitter, but do not consider attackers possessing multiple transmitters [4] , [7] . Data fusion with other navigation systems (Mode-S, PSR or other ATC systems) is another proposed technique in literature [8] , [9] . However, this is against the rationale of ADS-B, being the sole means of surveillance. In [10] , statistical location verification and grid based location estimation techniques are proposed, based on the collection of different time differences of arrival between two ADS-B sensors. All these techniques are certainly very valuable as they are able to verify aircraft positions in a transparent and local fashion without extensive, potentially prohibitive modifica-tions to hardware, software and/or infrastructure. The main disadvantage with this type of approaches is that no 100% proof can be obtained for a guaranteed success and they do not provide authentication or confidentiality. Therefore, the focus is here on the cryptographic approach.
There are several shortcomings with the currently proposed cryptographic schemes. First, all of the proposed schemes in literature [13] - [15] , [18] - [20] , [22] , [23] require a secure channel before each take-off between the aircraft and the trusted third party (TTP) in order to preload personal security material to be used during the flight. The presence of a secure channel is not always evident and can cause delay in case the TTP gets offline, especially, as several small airports only have radios as a communication equipment. Moreover, it also causes the whole system to be vulnerable against key escrow attacks [12] .
Second, most of the schemes [15] , [18] , [20] , [22] , [23] do not take into account the strict requirements regarding message size, available bandwidth or hardware, and are thus not compliant with the standard with respect to packet format and size of the message.. Moreover, some of the schemes require too high overhead [22] , [23] . There are also some schemes proposing the usage of cryptographic primitives with insufficient protection [13] - [15] , [20] .
Third, most of the schemes propose a solution for authentication [13] - [15] , [18] - [20] , [23] and only one scheme for encryption [22] . None of the approaches deals with a holistic solution, addressing the possibility to offer in the same framework one of the two options or to combine both. The advantage of not encrypting the messages is that it allows ADS-B to be an open protocol, such that also collaborative networks like the emerging OpenSky-Network [11] community can offer community-oriented services. However, in order to make it possible to apply ADS-B technology also for military aircraft or mission-critical civil airplanes, more privacy is required and confidentiality will present an important requirement. Moreover, if an aircraft is under attack by any kind of selective jamming or spoofing, it should have the possibility to hide its identity or even message in order to escape from the attack. Therefore, it should be able to provide a solution in each circumstance such that different security levels can be offered.
The proposed scheme, called Holistic Air Protection (HAP), will address each of the above identified shortcomings by using a combination of the Elliptic Curve Qu Vanstone (ECQV) implicit certificates and an elliptic curve (EC) based generalized signcryption scheme. The ECQV certificates avoid the need for a secure channel, while the generalized signcryption scheme, offering either signature generation, encryption or both, provides a flexible and broad approach to enable different security requirements in different settings or scenarios. The proposed scheme HAP results in an overhead of 256 bits up to 512 bits, depending on the security mode.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, related work is described in more detail. Section III discusses some background on ADS-B in general and the EC based operations. The proposed scheme HAP is explained in Section IV. Sections V and VI provide the evaluation of the scheme with respect to security and performance. In Section VII, it is shown how to choose the system parameters in order to offer the required performance as demanded in the standard. Finally, Section VIII presents the conclusions of the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The most important works related to cryptographic approaches to protect ADS-B are now described. A distinction is made between the symmetric and public key based schemes.
A. SYMMETRIC KEY BASED SCHEMES
Kacem et al. proposed in [13] , [14] to replace the Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) code of the data format of the message by a portion of the Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) digest in order to guarantee integrity and authentication. In order to respect the compliancy with the standard regarding to packet size, truncation of 24 bits of the MAC values are utilized, resulting in a significant weakness with respect to collision attacks. The secret keys to perform the HMAC operation with other ground controllers and passing airplanes are assumed to be preloaded before take-off of the airplane. However, as this operation is symmetric key based, no identity based authentication is obtained. Consequently, impersonation attacks by other malicious airplanes will become possible.
In [15] , the authors propose to encrypt the ICAO address of the airplane (unique identifier) in order to offer privacy and to break the link between identity of the aircraft and the actual location. In addition, the CRC code of the data format is replaced by a digest allowing to perform authentication of only the payload of the message, similar as in [13] , [14] . This authentication digest is derived from a key chain mechanism like proposed in the Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) broadcast authentication scheme [16] . There are at least two major issues to be mentioned in this scheme. First, the encrypted ICAO code is static and can be considered as a pseudonym. Consequently, if an attacker by some other mechanisms (e.g. predication algorithms) is able to link the pseudonym with the actual aircraft, tracking is still possible and this whole process is useless. Moreover, only ground controllers are able to verify the identity of the aircraft. Secondly, there are no mechanisms described on how to actually check the authentication of the message as it is not mentioned how the root of the key chain is distributed among the other airplanes. Consequently, any attacker can construct its own key chain and is thus still able to inject false messages in the air without being noticed.
The Security in the Air (SAT) scheme is completely based on TESLA [18] ] and has been inspired by the idea suggested in [17] . Here, the aircraft broadcasts every 30 seconds its certificate, public key and signed part of the key chain which is actually in use. In each interval, it further broadcasts a message, together with a digest including the previous key of the key chain. After sending the previous key of the key chain in clear text during the next interval, the receiver is able to verify the authentication of the message when the validity of the certificate is approved. Consequently, per message there are 144 additional bits to be added, together with another 920 bits (increased by the length of the certificate which is not added in their paper) every 30 seconds, in order to guarantee the authentication. However, in order to decrease the bandwidth and to obtain this small security overhead of 144 bits per message, the authors make a huge compromise in security by decreasing the length of the MAC message to 16 bits, resulting in a very insecure scheme. Moreover it is in conflict with their design criteria of offering security for a sufficiently long period up to the year 2030 as certification in the avionics domain is a very slow process. In addition, by considering explicit certificates, a lot of overhead in the communication of the security material is obtained.
Another scheme based on the TESLA protocol, very similar to [18] , is given in [19] and called Securing Open Skies (SOS). The main differences are that messages can be verified in batches, the message digest is set to 128 bits instead of 16, and the design is described in such a way that it is completely compliant with the current standard with respect to packet format and size. As a result, per batch, there is a security overhead of 256 bits. However, it should be noted that no mechanisms are described for authenticated communication between aircraft.
Consequently, combining ideas of [19] with respect to compatibility and security length on the one hand and [18] regarding the broadcast of security material on the other hand results in an interesting scheme to be used as benchmark for the evaluation of the proposed scheme HAP.
B. PUBLIC KEY BASED SCHEMES
The first public key based approach was by Pan et al. in 2012 [20] . To each message, they added an elliptic curve digital signature. Extensive X.509 certificates were considered to be preloaded in the other aircraft before take-off and verification is done by the ground controllers. Besides the usage of extensive X.509 certificates, another major disadvantage in their approach is that the proposed algorithms, being discrete logarithm operations on a 112-bit EC and a 160-bit SHA1 algorithm, are already broken [21] .
Two other public key based approaches for ADS-B are relying on identity based public key mechanisms in order to simplify the public key infrastructure. However, these mechanisms require compute intensive bilinear pairing operations and a very large bandwidth. In [22] , an encryption algorithm called Staged Identity Based Encryption (SIBE), is proposed, based on an 80-bit security level, requiring an overhead of at least 688 bits. Here, the complete message is encrypted and thus does not respect the open character of the protocol. The signature scheme Hierarchical Identity Based Signature (HIBS) is provided in [23] that allows batch verification of only the airplanes coming from the same airline. In order to perform a complete batch verification, unrealistic constraints are assumed on the validity of other parameters transmitted in the message. In addition, an overhead of 1344 bits in required for each message to be authenticated. Moreover, both schemes do not discuss any compliance with the standard regarding data format.
To conclude this part of related work, it can be seen that there is not yet a public key based scheme proposed with reasonable security overhead. Therefore, the focus will be later on the comparison with the symmetric key based algorithms using TESLA as underlying mechanism.
III. BACKGROUND A. ADS-B PROTOCOL
ADS-B is a satellite-based replacement of the radar systems. The aircraft uses onboard satellite navigation to determine their position and velocity. This (and other type of) information is periodically transmitted by the ADS-B Out subsystem in order to be processed by the air traffic controller (ATC) ground stations. These data can also be evaluated by other aircraft close by, if they are equipped with ADS-B In. Figure 1 provides an illustration of this process.
There are two major standards for ADS-B data link corresponding to the two different frequencies on which they operate. First, there is the 1090 MHz frequency band [25] , called Extended Squitter (1090ES). The second frequency band is the 978 MHz frequency band [26] , also called Universal Access Transceiver (UAT). This last one is only used by some general aviation aircraft in the US, which exclusively operate below Class A airspace. The channel bandwidth for both frequencies is 50 KHz.
The data size and format is different for UAT and 1090ES. In UAT, packets consist of 420 bits, from which 36 bits are dedicated to synchronization, 272 bits to the payload and VOLUME 7, 2019 112 bits to error correction. In 1090ES, the packets have only a length of 120 bits, from which 56 bits are dedicated to the payload. Other important fields of the 1090ES packet are the address of the unique identifier of the aircraft (ICAO) consisting of 24 bits and error correction field of 24 bits. The payload of the 1090ES packet further consists of a Type field (8 bits), identifying the type of the payload message. On average, 6.2 messages are sent per second over 60 seconds time interval [25] .
B. SECURITY ATTACKS
When designing a security protocol for ADS-B, the most powerful type of attackers need to be considered. Consequently, not only passive attackers eavesdropping the channel are assumed, but also active attackers, able to inject fake messages, modify and delete messages. In addition, the attackers can collaborate in order to make their attack even more successful. A complete overview of active attacks against ADS-B communication is provided in [27] , [28] . The most important attacks that can be executed with standard on-the-shelf hardware, such as a Software Defined Radio (SDR) [29] , are mentioned.
• Ghost Aircraft Injection/Flooding. Here, ADS-B messages, claiming to be an existing aircraft (so-called ghosts), are injected. They may lead to serious distress for both ground controllers and pilots.
• Aircraft Disappearance. By selectively jamming (as described in [30] ), all ADS-B messages referring to a single aircraft are deleted and result in the disappearance of the aircraft from the ADS-B channel.
• Aircraft Spoofing: Every ADS-B message includes an identifier, which can simply be replaced with an arbitrary one. Using the identifier of a trusted aircraft can reduce the likelihood for alarms when an unexpected object is detected on the radar [31] .
• Virtual Trajectory Modification: By selectively jamming messages of a certain aircraft and replacing them with modified location and heading data, a discrepancy between the real aircraft position and the one received by the ground controller is obtained [31] .
C. ELLIPTIC CURVE BASED OPERATIONS
ECC allows lightweight public key cryptographic solutions. For instance, corresponding with a 128 bit security parameter, a field size of 256 bits for ECC is sufficient, while RSA-based solutions require 3072 bits for the same security level. For a higher security level, the ratio between the required bits for ECC against RSA further increases. ECC is based on the algebraic structure of ECs over finite fields. The curve in the finite field F p is denoted by E p (a,b) , defined by the equation y 2 = x 3 + ax + b with a and b two constants in F p and = 4a 3 + 27 b 2 = 0. The base point generator of E p(a,b) of prime order q is denoted by G. All points on E p (a,b) , together with the infinite point form an additive group. In [32] , a list of secure curves is presented. In particular, the curve E25519 [33] over the prime field defined by the prime number 2 255 −19 is very interesting as it represents one of the fastest curves and possesses also resistance against the well-known implementation attacks [32] . It uses compressed EC points, where only the X coordinate is required to represent the complete point.
There are two main operations in ECC, being addition and multiplication. The addition of two points, P1 + P2 = R, results in a new EC point R. The scalar EC multiplication with r ∈ F q for a given EC point P is represented by R = rP = (R x , R y ), with R x , R y ∈ F p , resulting in the point R of the EC. The security on ECC relies on the two following computational hard problems.
• The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). This problem states that given two EC points R and Q of E p (a,b) , it is computationally hard for any polynomial-time bounded algorithm to determine a parameter x ∈ F * q , such that Q = xR.
• The Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman Problem (ECDHP).
Given two EC points R = xP, Q = yP with two unknown parameters x, y ∈ F * q , it is computationally hard for any polynomial-time bounded algorithm to determine the EC point xyP. [34] . The default mode SHAKE128(M , 256) can be used as a hash function with a 256-bit length and 128-bit overall security. The notation H is used to refer to this function.
It is further assumed that the EC parameters and the associated EC operations, together with the hash function are implemented in each entity participating the scheme. The two main primitives on which the proposed scheme relies are now shortly described.
1) ELLIPTIC CURVE QU VANSTONE MECHANISMS
The TTP, also called certificate authority (CA) in this context, is responsible for this process. As mentioned in [18] , the CA should be trusted over the world as the aircraft usually flies over different countries and continents. One possible candidate is the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) since this organization is already offering a public key infrastructure for assigning passports and more than 191 countries are member [35] .
The ECQV mechanism [36] possesses several interesting properties. First, the entity requesting for the security material, is the only one, thus also not the TTP, able to derive the private key. Therefore, the scheme is secure against key escrow. Second, no secure channel is required during the process as all variables can be sent over the open channel. Only an initial check on the validity of the identity is required. Finally, the scheme only requires the identity (e.g. 32-bit variable) and certificate (point of the curve), in order to derive the corresponding public key. This principle of implicit certificates leads to very small size of the certificates, compared to other approaches like X.509 certificates. The ECQV mechanism is typically applied in IoT contexts [37] , [38] , which is also a domain characterized by its constrained nature.
Denote the secret key pair of the TTP by (d TTP , Q TTP ). The different steps in the derivation of the key pair (d n , Q n ) for an entity with identity ID n are described in Figure 2 . Note that any other user can derive the public key of the user with identity ID n given its certificate cert n by
This follows from the fact that
2) GENERALIZED SIGNCRYPTION SCHEME
A generalized signcryption (GSC) scheme provides either confidentiality, authentication or a combination of both. The scheme used in here is a combination of a Schnorr signature scheme with a simple XOR operation for the encryption using a symmetric key derived by means of a Diffie Hellman key agreement [39] .
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME
The different security modes considered in the proposed scheme are first discussed. Next, the different phases in the scheme are described. Finally, it is explained how compatibility with the standard can be obtained.
A. DIFFERENT MODES
One important feature of HAP is that it allows to offer different security modes using the same type of framework. First, the differences between the four modes are explained.
• Level 1. This mode is the default mode and supports the open character of the ADS-B communication technology. Only authentication of the payload is included by computing a signature on the payload, where the public key for the verification of the signature is linked with the ICAO address.
• Level 2. From this mode on, protection against selectively jamming and spoofing is offered by means of an encrypted ICAO variable. Note that the actual ICAO verification can only be performed by the entity to which the encryption is directed, typically one of the ground controllers or aircraft in emergency mode. Emergency mode would be for example in case of presence of a terroristic attack, in case many deviations with respect to prediction module are notified, etc. All other entities, being in the possession of the public key and an additional security parameter inherent to the flight of the predicted entity, are still able to verify the authentication of the payload of the message.
• Level 3. In this situation, the broadcast communication is not open anymore and only intended to one specific receiver. Both ICAO and payload are encrypted. This can be the case for highly secured transport, for instance in case of military or mission-criticial oriented flights.
• Level 4. This is the ultimate security mode in which besides encryption (like in Level 3) also a signature is included, offering in addition non repudiation of the message. To conclude, levels 1 and 2 are mainly for airplanes in a commercial setting, while levels 3 and 4 are aimed for more security sensitive transport. The standard level should always be 1. However, in case of presumption on the presence of attackers, for instance when a threshold level of deviations between predicted and received values is reached or no authenticated verifications can be done for several consecutive time intervals, the aircraft should be in the possibility to increase its security level, as will be explained later.
B. DIFFERENT PHASES
Like all other security schemes for ADS-B, three different phases are considered: set-up phase, online phase, and verification phase. Each of them is now discussed in more detail.
1) SET-UP PHASE
This phase consists of three parts.
• First, there is the one-time registration in order to derive for a given aircraft with identity ID A its long term private key d A and public key Q A based on the certificate cert A , determined by the ECQV algorithm. A secure channel is required in this process in order to guarantee that the generated certificate is linked to the identity requesting the certificate. • Second, before take-off, the aircraft requests a short term private and public key to be used during the flight. Therefore, the aircraft with identity ID A sends the unique number of its flight, provided by the ICAO parameter and signed by its private key. In addition, in order to avoid replay attacks, the aircraft also needs to possess for each ICAO the absolute time slot T 0 on which the flight gets activated and the corresponding time interval T int , similar as in TESLA.
It is assumed that T int is a fixed system parameter. The aircraft signs T 0 using its short term private key. Finally, in order to be able to activate security level 2, the aircraft also needs to possess for each ICAO an emergency security parameter, denoted here by K a . Note that only for the transmission of this value K a , a secure channel with the TTP is required.
• The last step of the set-up phase is the storage phase. Similar as in [13] , [14] , the flight plan is uploaded in the memory of the aircraft before departure. An aircraft prediction module, as described by Robert Pastor [40] , calculates the trajectory of the aircraft. Specifications provided by Base of Aircraft Data (BADA) [41] are used to calculate a realistic trajectory. Moreover, the publicly available list of public keys and signed boot-up times of the aircraft (together with the corresponding ICAO) and ground controllers (together with corresponding identity) present on the trajectory are also uploaded. If a secure channel is available with the TTP, also the corresponding list of emergency security parameters K a of the different aircraft on its trajectory is uploaded in case the submitted trajectory is approved by the TTP.
2) ONLINE PHASE
The most complete version of the scheme consists of the following steps. Let Q be a public key of one of the aircraft or ground controllers on its trajectory. Denote by m = (ICAO P 0 · · · P n−1 ), the concatenation of the ICAO and payload data of n buffered messages to be sent in the active time slot T i . Assume H (0) = 0. The length of the ICAO identifier equals to 24 bits. As will be explained later on, the maximum length of security material to be included in one packet will be 48 bits. 1) Choose random value y ∈ F q , compute Y = yG.
2) Derive key
Compute s = y − hd AF For each of the four different modes, explained above, a slight variation of the different steps in the procedure are required.
• Level 1. In this mode, the ICAO is unencrypted, K a is set to zero, and the payload data is signed. As a consequence, step 2 in the procedure above is not executed (c = m) and the message (c, s, h) is broadcasted.
• Level 2. In this mode, the ICAO is encrypted, the encrypted ICAO and payload data are signed and K a is used in the computation of h. Note that the encrypted value of ICAO should be spread over all messages and therefore the output of the SHAKE function equals to 24 + 24 * 11, thus H (K x ) = SHAKE128(c Y T i K a , 24n+24 * 11). Only ICAO and not the payload is encrypted in step 3. The output of the protocol now consists of the message (c, s, Y )
• Level 3. In this mode, the ICAO and payload data are encrypted and not signed. The output length of the SHAKE function on ICAO contains 24n+24 * 6. If there are more than 6 packets to be encrypted, the output length of the SHAKE function on (P 0 · · · P n−1 ) equals to 48 * n, otherwise the default SHAKE128 function is used with output length 256 and truncated at 48 * n bits.
Steps 4 and 5 are not required anymore. The output of the protocol consists of (c, Y ).
• Level 4. In this mode, the ICAO and payload data are encrypted and signed. The output of the SHAKE function on ICAO equals to 24+24 * 11, while for the payload of the messages the same procedure as explained for Level 3 is applied. In this case, the whole process is executed and the message (c, s, Y ) is broadcasted.
3) VERIFICATION PHASE
The description of the most complete version of the verification scheme is first given. Later on, the consequences for the four different security modes are discussed. Denote by d the private key corresponding with the public key Q used in the online phase.
• Level 1. In order to know which public key Q AF to be used in step 1 of the verification phase, the public key corresponding to the ICAO of the message, is derived from the memory. Also given the actual time and the boot-up time T 0 , the time slot T i is derived. Next, only the first two steps are executed with parameter K a = 0 in step 2.
• Level 2. There is a difference between the two types of receivers. For the intended receiver in the possession of the private key, first step 3 is executed, such that the secret key can be derived in order to find the real ICAO parameter (step 4) and thus the corresponding public key, boot-up time T 0 , and secret emergency key K a of the flight. This key is used to verify step 1 using the hash value of step 2.
For the other receivers, the prediction module of the aircraft/ground controller is called in order to derive the public key Q AF and corresponding parameters K a , T 0 of the transmitter. Using these predicted values, the two first steps in the verification phase are sequentially executed. Note that the emergency key K a is required in order to prevent that other not authorized prediction modules are also able to derive the public key (and thus the identity ICAO) by means of exhaustive search among all possible candidates. It should also be mentioned that even if K a is leaked by a potentially malicious aircraft, it will not lead to fake messages as this entity is not able to fake the underlying signature.
• Level 3. This message is only meaningful to the entity in the possession of the correct private key. As there is no signature related information, only steps 3 and 4 are done.
• Level 4. Again the message is only meaningful to the entity in the possession of the correct private key. Now the complete process is executed with steps 2 and 1 swapped. We have to note that in practice, due to obvious issues as delays and emergencies, it is rather impossible to completely predict all aircraft on its trajectory. For security level 1, it is important that the security material of the aircraft on its trajectory is stored. Here it does not matter if the location of the aircraft corresponds with the predicted location provided by the prediction module. For the higher security levels, the position of the aircraft should also correspond with the one provided by the prediction module because otherwise it would require too much computation power to try all the different stored possibilities.
C. COMPATIBILITY WITH STANDARD
In order to be compliant with the standard with respect to packet format and size, the messages containing the security material, need to fit the data format of 1090ES messages. Therefore, HAP defines the following format to make the security related information (the fields containing parameters like Y , s, h, not c) fit in the 56 bits payload field of the 1090ES packet.
• Similar as in [19] and according the standard, the first 8 bits of this payload are dedicated to the type of the message. For the type, numbers 25 till 27 and 30 are reserved [25] . It is proposed to use these reserved numbers to indicate the different security modes in which the protocol can operate.
• The 48 remaining bits of the packet are dedicated to include the actual security material. Note that the hash value h from the authentication digest in step 4 is truncated to 128 bits instead of the 256 bit output of the default SHAKE function. This has no major impact on the security as the only somehow feasible attack with theoretical complexity of 2 64 would be a pre-image or collision attack based on the birthday paradox. However, even if another input of the hash is found, without knowledge of the private key, the signature cannot be made on any other acceptable input due to the computational hardness of the ECDLP. Note that the output length of the authentication digit in [19] is also set to 128 bits. However, there the impact of a shorter digit is more severe because a successful pre-image attack will allow to create another hash chain, resulting in a complete impersonation attack on an aircraft. Since the maximum size of a transmitted message equals to 512 bits (Level 2, Level 4), fragmentation is limited to at most 11 packets, while 8 packets for security Level 1 and only 6 packets for security Level 3. Figure 3 illustrates graphically the difference between a standard 1090ES packet and the newly added packets, which only differ in the payload field. For security modes 2, 3 and 4, the original packets are changed. However, adaptations are limited to the ICAO field (Level 2) and also payload field (Level 3, 4). Figure 4 shows the difference regarding format and structure of the packets for the 4 different security levels.
V. SECURITY EVALUATION
First, it should be mentioned that in HAP, for obtaining security level 1, no secure channel is required between the TTP and the aircraft in order to share the key material. Moreover, the TTP cannot create the private key material of the aircraft due to inherent construction of the ECQV mechanism. Consequently, in case of key escrow, the system will still be secure and also even if no secure connection with the TTP can be guaranteed, the required key material can still be derived.
Only if security levels higher than 2 should be reached, a secure channel is needed to share the emergency keys. The higher security levels do not only offer more privacy and confidentiality, also a better protection against different specific types of attacks can be avoided as will be discussed below in more detail.
A. PACKET INJECTION
The goal of this attack is to inject false ADS-B messages in order to cause confusion with the pilots and ground controllers. These messages do satisfy the correct format with respect to the different fields, but cannot be signed as the attacker is not aware of a valid private key from one of the aircraft on the trajectory. VOLUME 7, 2019 It is assumed that the number of transmitted messages is fixed in each time interval. Therefore, this type of attack can be easily recognized. For the security levels 2,3,4 with encryption, identification of the false messages can be easily done as the encryption of the ICAO message runs over the different valid messages. For security level 1, additional verifications need to be done. First, since in HAP, the aircraft and ground controllers have the predicted trajectory already in their memory, they can more easily discard the messages that clearly do not contain valid information. Second, for the remaining messages, they need to do the signature verification. Given that the number of messages in a time interval is fixed and set to n, the additional number of signature verifications equals to n k , with k the number of injected packets. In order to avoid too large overhead or in case the aircraft is not able to perform a successful authentication verification, the system can decide to broadcast a signed request for an increase of security level because of possible attack. Therefore, it uses another reserved type, for instance 32, in the ADS-B packet. Aircraft receiving this message, after verifying the signature, can switch to a higher security level for critical messages.
B. SELECTIVE JAMMING AND SPOOFING
The main goals of these type of attacks is to cause aircraft disappearance or to virtually modify the trajectory. If an aircraft detects deviation with respect to the predicted situation for a particular aircraft, it sends an encrypted and signed message to this aircraft, asking the current status, i.e. switches to security mode 4. This mode is the only one able to escape from this situation since encryption is required to avoid that the attacker can still distinguish the originator and signature generation is needed to distinguish from a falsly injected request.
C. PACKET MODIFICATION
There are different possibilities for this type of attack. An attacker can change the content of the payload to send false information and cause stress, it can change the identifier (ICAO) of the packet to cause impersonation or it can simply change some bits in the message and also CRC check in order to avoid verification of the message by the receiver. In all these situations, there will be no successful verification of the messages during that time interval. Similar as in the previous case, the aircraft should broadcast a signed request for an increase of security level because of a possible attack.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The performance of HAP is now discussed, using the TESLA based approach [18] , [19] as benchmark since this is the only type of scheme currently proposed in literature, which promises some reasonable trade-off between security and performance. Note that from a security point of view, the TESLA based scheme can only reach security level 1 of HAP.
A. PERFORMANCE FOR ONLINE AND VERIFICATION PHASE
In order to give a fair comparison between HAP and the TESLA based approach, two different set-up phases for the TESLA protocol need to be considered.
• A first possibility is that, similar to HAP, the required security material from the predicted aircraft on its trajectory are uploaded. In the case of a TESLA based protocol, it would mean the root key K 0 of the hash chain, the absolute value T 0 of the boot-up time of the flight, the time interval T int , the length of the hash chain N , and the corresponding ICAO address for each aircraft. Again, it is assumed that T int is fixed by design.
• Second, the aircraft can also periodically transmit the key material, signed using its private key. The key material in this case should consist of the current key K i of the hash chain and the corresponding time slot T i in which the key is active. It is here assumed that the ECQV certificate, together with the expiration time TS, is sent instead of the combination X.509 certificate and public key as proposed in [18] . As suggested in [18] , a certificate broadcast every 30 seconds is required in order to have sufficient time to react on a potential collision. The difference between HAP and TESLA, both for computation and communication, and for both scenarios described above, are now discussed.
1) SCENARIO 1: PRELOADING OF SECURITY MATERIAL a: COMPUTATIONAL EFFORT
In case of the TESLA based protocol, when a message in time slot i is received, N − i hashes with N the length of the hash chain are required by the receiving entity. In [18] , it is suggested to have a hash chain which is valid for at least 48 hours. Consequently, in the worst case, 48 · 720 = 34, 560 hash operations are required for a time interval of length 5s like in [18] , which increases to 48 · 1800 = 86, 400 for a time interval of length 2s as in [19] .
In HAP, the effort for verifying a message by the receiving entity is constant in all cases and is mostly determined by the effort of executing 2 EC point multiplications, 1 EC addition and 1 hash operation.
Using the cryptographic library MIRACL, these operations have been implemented on a personal computer (PC) with an Intel I5-3210M 2.50GHz Center Processor Unit (CPU), containing 8 GB Random Access Memory (RAM), and running the Windows 7 operation system. As a result, it takes in the worst case 34.56ms and 86.4ms for the TESLA based approach with time interval length of 5s [18] and 2s [19] respectively, while this number is in HAP always fixed to approximately 1.93ms.
b: COMMUNICATION EFFORT
With respect to the security overhead in bits per transmitted message, the TESLA based methods require 256 bits, while in HAP 384 bits are needed for security level 1, 512 bits for security levels 2 and 4, and 256 bits for security level 3. Consequently, the default security level 1 of HAP requires 128 additional bits, compared to the TESLA based approach, corresponding with an increase of 50%.
2) SCENARIO 2: UPDATE OF SECURITY MATERIAL a: COMPUTATIONAL EFFORT
In both HAP and the TESLA based approach, a verification of the signature needs to be done, requiring 1 EC point multiplication, 1 EC point addition and 1 hash operation for computing the public key from the certificate and 2 EC point multiplications, 1 EC point addition and 1 hash operation for the verification of the signature or a total of 3.56ms on the PC. Once the key material is agreed on, the computation for verifying the authentication in the TESLA based approach is extremely efficient and corresponds basically with 1 hash operation or 0.001ms on the PC. However, the validation is only obtained after waiting one time interval. In HAP for security level 1, the verification of the signature is a factor approximately 2000 higher and requires 1.93ms on the PC, but results in an immediate outcome. For security levels 2 and 4 in HAP, 2.89ms computation are needed, while for security level 3 only 0.96ms.
b: COMMUNICATION EFFORT
Taking into account a 128 bit security level and a length of 16 bits for the indication of the time slot and the expiration time of the certificate, each update in the TESLA based approach requires an additional overhead of 800 bits security material. If the same scenario in HAP is considered, only the certificate, time slot and expiration time needs to be sent, resulting an overhead of 288 bits. Note that security levels higher than 2 are not possible anymore in this scenario as the emergency security key K a cannot be securely broadcasted, and so the scheme falls back in this scenario to the same features as the TESLA based schemes.
The security overhead in bits for each approach is now computed for a time frame of 30 seconds, suggested by [18] as the required time interval to perform an update. For the TESLA based approach with a time interval of 2s, this ends up in 4640 bits, compared to 6048 in HAP for security level 1. However, when the time interval increases to 5s like in [18] , the TESLA based approach needs an additional 2366 bits, compared to 2592 bits for HAP in security level 1. Consequently, for larger time intervals, HAP becomes more and more efficient. In particular, already for n = 6, HAP starts to outperform.
3) PREFERRED SCENARIO FOR SAME TIME INTERVAL For HAP, scenario 1 is the most optimal both with respect to security and performance as it allows to use the four security levels during its trajectory and it limits the bandwidth since no additional certificates need to be sent anymore. On the other hand, for the TESLA based approach, scenario 2 is more optimal since it avoid the compute intensive computations for deriving the root key in the hash chain. This also corresponds to the set-up phase described in [18] , [19] . Therefore, both approaches are now also compared.
a: COMPUTATIONAL EFFORT
From a computational point of view, the TESLA based approach only needs limited computation effort to verify the signature each broadcast period and negligible time to compute the authentication digest. However, the main drawback is the delay in receiving the effective result of the verification, which is linked with the time interval of the protocol. In HAP, a constant effort for the verification of the signature is needed, but requires a significantly higher amount of time for the computation. However, even with this computational effort, HAP is still able to derive the answer on the authentication question more than 1000 and even 2500 times faster compared to TESLA with time interval of 2s and 5s respectively.
b: COMMUNICATION EFFORT
The security overhead is now again compared for a time frame of 30 seconds. In HAP, an additional 5760 bits are obtained when n = 2 and 2304 bits when n = 5. Consequently, compared to the numbers of the TESLA based approach, HAP starts to outperform already from time intervals larger than 5s.
B. PERFORMANCE FOR SET-UP PHASE
The procedures as described by the set-up phase (after registration) for both HAP and TESLA based approach are followed in order to compute the required time needed for the TTP to establish the security material. In HAP, the TTP only needs to derive 1 certificate and 1 emergency key per ICAO. In security level 1, without need for a secure channel and thus no transmission of the emergency key, this requires a time of 0.97 ms per aircraft on the PC. In all other security levels of HAP, first a common secret key should be established and thus a time of 2.90ms per aircraft is required using the same signcryption scheme as during the online phase.
For the TESLA based approach, the complete key chain needs to be computed and send in a secure way to the aircraft. Consequently, this results in a time of 36.49ms and 88.33ms for the TESLA based approach with time interval length of 5s [18] and 2s [19] respectively.
The difference between the approach and the TESLA based solutions is immense. This impact becomes in particular significant for a high number of aircraft demanding security material at the same time. For instance, just to give an idea, in case of 1000 aircraft, it would take 48.2 minutes for HAP, while approximately 10.14 and 24.54 hours for the TESLA based approach with time interval lengths of 5s [18] and 2s [19] respectively, using the implementation on PC.
VII. DETERMINATION OF THE TIME INTERVAL
The analysis will be based on the RTCA DO-242 regulation, demanding that ADS-B data needs to be updated at least once every 12s with a probability of 98 % when 1250 aircraft VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 5. Maximum allowed consecutive time intervals in order to ensure that ADS-B data can be updated at least once every 12s.
are simultaneously sending ADS-B packets within the operational domain radius.
On the other hand, the length of 30s for the broadcast period has been calculated in [18] , based on the reasonable assumption that 2.5 minutes are required to start an action in order to avoid a collision. Taking both this assumption and the regulation into account, Figure 5 shows the maximum allowed consecutive time intervals in which the authentication fails due to a packet error in one of the packets, for time interval sizes between 2s and 5s, both for HAP and the TESLA based approach. It is clear that HAP can always afford one additional interval as it does the instantaneous check of the authentication and does not need to wait until the next interval. Now the maximum probability of not meeting the regulation in each of these situations is determined. Based on the fact that it takes 800 bits or 18 packets in TESLA to transmit a new certificate message to be used in each period, in order to still satisfy the criteria of RTCA DO-242, the maximum probability of having one false packet in 18 consecutive packets should be lower than 2%. If 6 packets per second are sent, it would mean 1 packet loss per second. This assumption allows us to derive the likelihood that the regulation would not be satisfied. In the calculation, it is considered that 6 packets are sent every second, where all packets over one interval are buffered in order to compute the authentication digest over it. Consequently, as can be derived from Fig. 6 , the probability in HAP is not visible for n smaller than 3 since it is really negligible (less than 10 −6 %). It is also important to note that TESLA for time interval equal to 5 has a significant probability of 20% for not satisfying the regulation.
Consequently, in order to make a safe decision on the time interval, time intervals in HAP of 2s and 3s should be preferred. In addition, the probability that an update cannot be made every 12s taking into account different probabilities for packet loss per second is also calculated. Fig. 7 shows that a packet loss per second of 13%, starts to have a probability of 1% for causing problems with HAP having time interval equal to 3, while this probability is still a factor 100 lower for HAP with time interval equal to 2. To conclude, the decision FIGURE 6. Maximum probability that ADS-B data cannot be updated at least once every 12s with a probability of 98% when 1250 aircraft are simultaneously sending ADS-B packets within the operational domain radius.
FIGURE 7.
Maximum probability that ADS-B data cannot be updated at least once every 12s with a varying probability for packet loss per second for HAP with time intervals equal to 2s and 3s.
on the time interval is closely related to the packet error rate and should be carefully chosen. In fact, due to the flexibility of HAP, this parameter can even be changed along the way.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a new security scheme for protecting air communication in a holistic manner, called HAP. The scheme is designed in such a way that using the same framework, it is able to create signatures, encrypt only the ICAO identifier or also the message payload, or do both signature generation and encryption. As a consequence, there are 4 security modes defined, where the first mode allows to support the open character of ADS-B, while the other modes can be used in case of attacks or for more security sensitive transports. Its design is based on well-established security primitives like ECQV, Schnorr signature scheme and Diffie Hellmann key exchange. Moreover, HAP is made completely compliant with the standard regarding packet format and sizes, which would facilitate the integration.
HAP, in particular for its default security mode 1, is compared with respect to the most promising symmetric key based scheme relying on the TESLA broadcast protocol. Although the number of bits to be transmitted is slightly higher in HAP, still many advantages compared to TESLA are obtained. First, a faster authentication is obtained as it is not needed to wait until the next time interval. This has a major consequence in being able to guarantee that every 12s an update can be made as demanded in the standard, which is much harder for TESLA given the same probability of packet loss. Second, the set-up phase for TESLA requires a secure channel with the TTP and an enormous amount of computations for deriving very long key chains. Especially in case many aircraft are demanding at the same time security material, this can cause serious problems. Note that only for security levels higher than 2, a secure channel is also required in HAP. Finally, due to the choice of taking message digests of length 128 bits, the scheme becomes theoretically vulnerable for impersonation attacks as collision attacks can be performed. If this digest is set to 256 bits, the same amount of security overhead is obtained, or in fact, even slightly higher because of the additional periodic broadcast of certificates and key material in TESLA.
It should be mentioned that the proposed theoretical analysis of the performance in this paper is based on regulations set in the standard, which are currently not realistic since they are not yet achieved as shown in [42] due to very high packet loss of approximately 70%. Nevertheless, the main goal was to provide a comparison with the other interesting cryptographic approach of [18] , [19] . Although, due to this high packet loss, HAP will not be able for the moment to offer the required performance in practice, it provides us a good solution in case the technical bottlenecks required to reach the guidelines are solved (e.g. by means of CSMA techniques and others).
